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Book Note
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, by Ernest J Weinrib1
ANTHONY R SANGIULIANO
AS THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA has recently proclaimed,2 the philosophical

idea of corrective justice constitutes private law’s indigenous normative structure,
and it guides judges’ practical reasoning when they adjudicate disputes over
interpersonal liability. It is a venerable idea, first articulated by Aristotle3 and
later elaborated by Immanuel Kant4 and G.W.F. Hegel.5
Ernest Weinrib’s methodological articulation of the meaning and content
of corrective justice in The Idea of Private Law6 has strongly influenced the
development of private law theory, particularly tort law theory.7 In his new
book, Weinrib displays the rich theoretical resources that corrective justice offers
for theorizing about matters of recent legal and academic debate. The book is not
limited to the horizon of tort law, exploring other private law causes of action and
selected topics in public law.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 343 pages.
See Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32, [2012] 2 SCR 181 at para 7.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed, translated by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000) at 87-88 [Book V, ch 4, 1132a-b].
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed, translated by Mary Gregor, in The Works of
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353 at
401-52 [6:245-6:308].
GWF Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed Allen W Wood, translated by HB Nesbit
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 67-72 [§§ 34-40].
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995).
See e.g. Arthur Ripstein, “Editor’s Note” (2011) 61:2 UTLJ i; Bruce Chapman, “Ernie’s
Three Worlds” (2011) 61:2 UTLJ 179; John Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The
Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30:1 L & Phil 1 at 1-6. Weinrib’s work has, of course,
not been without its detractors. See e.g. Allan C Hutchinson, “The Importance of not Being
Ernest” (1989) 34:2 McGill LJ 233.
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In chapter one, Weinrib explains that corrective justice is the ideal that
underpins all private law claims by a plaintiff against a defendant. It is a juridical
ideal; it abstracts the distinctive normative structure intrinsic to the plaintiffdefendant relationship from its unification under private law. Weinrib thus
opposes those who treat private law as an instrument for attaining social
goals—such as economic efficiency—the desirability of which is extrinsic to
the plaintiff-defendant relationship.
According to the juridical conception of corrective justice, private law regards
the parties to a lawsuit as active and passive poles of the same injustice. The injustice
consists in a disruption of the parties’ equality, whereby each party has what is
rightfully his or hers. It is rectified when a remedy corrects the plaintiff’s deficiency
by depleting the defendant’s excess. The correlativity in the plaintiff-defendant
relationship entails that each party’s normative situation is relevant only in
relation to that of the other. Hence, for the parties to be treated fairly by a
judge, practical reasons unilaterally applicable to only one party—such as its deep
pockets or insurability against loss—are irrelevant.
In chapter two, Weinrib shows that corrective justice clarifies the “general
conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care” outlined by Lord Atkin in
Donoghue v Stevenson8 and that the landmark tort cases disclose judicial attempts
to articulate this ideal. He argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s9 current
approach to the concept of a duty of care disintegrates Lord Atkin’s “general
conception” by introducing policy considerations into the analysis that either
apply unilaterally to plaintiff or defendant or advance a value that is external to the
plaintiff-defendant relationship. Chapter three is about remedies. Weinrib argues
that private law injustices should be understood as normative reasons for remedies,
rather than as causative events of which remedies are consequences. Chapter four
extends this argument to restitutionary remedies for gain-based damages.
In chapter five, Weinrib distinguishes between in rem rights and in personam
rights to defend the proposition, famously repudiated by Fuller and Perdue,10
that the standard measure of damages for contractual breach is the expectation
measure. He also criticizes the Court’s recent approval of punitive damage awards
for contractual breach.11 The reasoning that informs such awards is deficient because
it incorporates considerations unilaterally applicable to the defendant, i.e., the
8. [1932] AC 563 (HL) at 580.
9. See Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 357.
10. LL Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” (1937) 46:1
Yale LJ 1.
11. See Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 595.
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social disapproval of the defendant’s conduct, rather than considerations that
embrace the parties’ relationship as a whole. In chapter six, Weinrib advances a
novel theory of unjust enrichment, a dynamic area of private law that has recently
attracted scholars’ sustained attention.12
The final chapters show how corrective justice applies to areas other than
private law. Chapter seven discusses the doctrine of unrequested improvements
in Jewish law. Chapter eight defends a Kantian approach to property law and
redistributive taxation. Chapter nine explores the disjunction in modern legal
education between the study of law as a practical enterprise in support of the
legal profession and the study of law as an academic enterprise based on the
model of university education.
While Weinrib’s writing exhibits the rigour of philosophical inquiry, it is also
notable for the imagery it invokes; he uses helpful spatial metaphors to illustrate
how the elements of the plaintiff-defendant relationship interlock through law
to form a symmetrical, integrated unit. His book is a sterling example of how
philosophical argumentation can be effectively combined with doctrinal analysis.
It thus has an audience in philosophers and lawyers alike.

12. See e.g. Jennifer M Nadler, “What Right Does Unjust Enrichment Law Protect?” (2008)
28:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 245; Zoë Sinel, “Through Thick and Thin: The Place of Corrective
Justice in Unjust Enrichment” (2011) 31:3 Oxford J Legal Stud 551.

